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Forward Guidance under Disagreement





This paper compares the effectiveness of date- and state-based forward
guidance issued by the Federal Reserve since mid-2011 accounting for the
influence of disagreement within the FOMC. Effectiveness is investigated
through the lens of interest rates’ sensitivity to macroeconomic news and I
find that the Fed’s forward guidance reduces the sensitivity and therefore
crowds out other public information. The sensitivity shrinkage is stronger
in the case of date-based forward guidance due to its unconditional nature.
Yet, high levels of disagreement among monetary policy makers as pub-
lished through the FOMC’s dot projections since 2012 partially restore sen-
sitivity to macroeconomic news. Thus, disagreement appears to lower the
information content of forward guidance and to weaken the Fed’s commit-
ment as perceived by financial markets. The dot projections are therefore
able to reduce the focal point character of forward guidance.
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bank interest rate projections, monetary policy committee, disagreement.
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1 Introduction
Forward guidance has become a key instrument in central banking over the past years
as the need to manage expectations about the future path of monetary policy has in-
creased. According to e.g. (7), forward guidance is essential for an effective monetary
policy when policy rates are very low and uncertainty is high. Since the Federal Re-
serve (Fed) and other central banks (as e.g. the European Central Bank and the Bank of
Canada) adopted this measure as a consequence of the financial crisis, the term forward
guidance has come to be interpreted as a promise to keep interest rates low for an ex-
tended or explicit period of time or until a certain condition is met.1 Yet, forward guid-
ance had already been used before the crisis in conjunction with other macroeconomic
projections as a measure of expectations management and central bank transparency.
The Fed’s forward guidance has experienced different designs, especially since the
eruption of the financial crisis.2 In December 2008, the Fed started off with a qualita-
tive open-ended forward guidance which was then extended to include explicit time
and state dimensions. Specifically, from August 2011, the Fed provided unconditional
forward guidance in the form of a date-based commitment to keep interest rates low
for an explicit period of time. This horizon was adjusted in subsequent monetary pol-
icy meetings. In December 2012, the Fed then adopted state-based forward guidance
by linking a future rise in the federal funds rate to certain outcomes in unemployment
and inflation.3 This step conditioned forward guidance on macroeconomic develop-
ments and thus made it less rigid. In January 2012, the participants of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC)4 began to provide their individual assessments of
the appropriate future policy rate path in order to enhance the public’s understanding
of monetary policy decisions that depend on the Committee’s assessment of macroe-
conomic conditions, see (18). Before, the FOMC had already published a tendency of
1For a review of forward guidance strategies at the zero lower bound by the Fed, the Bank of Eng-
land, the ECB and the Bank of Japan, see (23), (9) and (10). For research on the effects on expectations by
committing to a future policy path in the context of low interest rates, see e.g. (14).
2This paper concentrates on the Fed’s forward guidance issued since 2008. For literature on the
Fed’s communication and forward guidance beforehand - including the period between 2003-2005, see
e.g. (40) and (27).
3Date- and state-based forward guidance are sometimes also referred to as calendar- and threshold-
based forward guidance, compare (21).
4In fact, not only the members of the FOMC but also the non-voting Reserve Bank presidents provide
their assessments within the Summary of Economic Projections. Hereinafter, if not explicitly stated,
the term “participants” comprises all those who participate in the assessment that is published by the
FOMC. For further details, see Chapter 3 and Appendix A.
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macroeconomic projections based on individuals’ assessments of the appropriate fu-
ture policy rate. Yet, a clear communication of the latter with all individual projections
conveying the Committee’s disagreement is expected to influence market expectations
about future monetary policy. However, it is still unclear how and to what extent mar-
kets react to this kind of forward interest rate publications.
This paper is the first to comprehensively compare the effectiveness of date- and
state-based forward guidance and to consider the impact of disagreement within the
FOMC thereon. Specifically, this paper builds on (39) and (35) and investigates effec-
tiveness through the lens of interest rates’ sensitivity to macroeconomic news. Macroe-
conomic models suggest that macroeconomic news do not persistently impact short-
term interest rates. Therefore long-term rates that represent the expected future path of
short rates should not be affected. However, (25) find that interest rates along the term-
structure move upon a macroeconomic surprise. This reaction pattern can be used in
order to analyze the effect of central banks’ expectations management on the yield
curve. For conditional and unbinding forward guidance, one would wish sensitivity
to either stay constant or even rise (compare 29) as the central bank projection just
increases the information set of market participants and should not crowd out other
signals. Market participants would thus understand the conditional nature of forward
guidance. By contrast, forward guidance that conveys sort of a commitment would
result in a lower responsiveness of interest rates of respective maturities if the promise
is perceived as credible. This rather unconditional forward guidance would consti-
tute a focal point in the financial market such that interest rates would be less affected
by macroeconomic news. Forward guidance thus crowds out other information that
market participants would typically use to form expectations. While date-based for-
ward guidance can be considered as being purely unconditional, state-based forward
guidance is conditional and still contains some commitment character. Therefore, one
would expect the sensitivity of interest rates to macroeconomic news to be higher than
in the unconditional case.
The sample of this paper covers a base period from December 2008 until August
2011 and I allow for an altered sensitivity change due to date- and state-based for-
ward guidance respectively thereafter. I find that both date- and state-based forward
guidance are effective in lowering the sensitivity of Treasury yields to macroeconomic
news. Yet, the impact of date-based forward guidance is stronger. This is due to its
unconditional character which induces market participants to be less attentive to other
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macroeconomic developments. As credibility is crucial for the effectiveness of for-
ward guidance, this implies that financial market participants believe in the promise
by the central bank to keep interest rates low, despite a potential time-inconsistency
problem. By contrast, under state-based forward guidance, the sensitivity shrinkage
is less pronounced as market expectations are steered to account for macroeconomic
developments.
A key contribution of this paper is to let these effects differ with the level of dis-
agreement on the future policy path that is provided in the quarterly dot projections of
the FOMC. These projections reveal that policy makers do not entirely agree on future
monetary policy. Thus, if the central bank provides information on disagreement, this
could be detrimental to the impact of forward guidance. In line with this intuition, I
find that high levels of disagreement among policy makers result in a higher sensitiv-
ity of interest rates to macroeconomic news especially during the date-based forward
guidance period for the medium- to longer-run. Thus, the publication of dot projec-
tions as a measure to heighten transparency is able to reduce the focal point character
of forward guidance and somehow responds to the criticism of (30).
This analysis arrives at the result that financial market participants attached cre-
dence to the Fed’s forward guidance since the financial crisis erupted in 2008. The
findings further support that conditioning forward guidance and publishing dot pro-
jections conveying the disagreement among monetary policy makers helps to consoli-
date financial market participants’ attentiveness to information.
This paper contributes to a strand of literature that examines the effectiveness of
forward guidance by means of sensitivity analysis and is therefore closely related to
e.g. (39), (35) as well as (29). It further contributes to the literature on decision making
of monetary policy committees and the communication of those decisions. While some
literature is in favor of communicating only the consensus view of committee members
(15), (36) argue that dissenting votes help to better anticipate future monetary policy
decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next chapter, I summarize the
evolution of the Fed’s forward guidance since 2008 and link it to the literature. In
Chapter 2.3.1 the empirical model is introduced and the empirical results on date- and
state-based forward guidance are presented. Chapter 3 discusses the FOMC’s dot pro-
jections as well as several measures of disagreement. In Chapter 4, the empirical model
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is augmented by measures of disagreement. It will further present some robustness
checks where I control for policy uncertainty and then allow for asymmetric effects
due to interest rates’ proximity to the zero lower bound. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes.
2 The FOMC’s Forward Guidance since 2008
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is responsible for the conduct of mon-
etary policy at the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed). The FOMC meets regularly eight times
a year to review the current target level for the federal funds rate and to steer market
expectations about its future level, for instance through issuing economic projections.
While monetary policy decisions at the Fed were not announced at all before 1994
(see ? ), policy makers have moved to making concrete statements and now even
provide forward guidance in their monetary policy statements (see 43).5 The FOMC
already issued forward guidance from 2003 to 2005 when the federal funds rate was
at 1%, affirming that “policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable
period” (17). As the policy rate approached the zero lower bound in December 2008,
the Fed again started projecting future levels of the federal funds rate. Traditional
monetary policy was bounded and forward guidance therefore became an essential
tool (see 7).
Forward guidance was adopted by several other central banks already before the
financial crisis in order to manage financial markets’ expectations and to make the
public learn about the central bank’s reaction function.6 This expectations manage-
ment was further intended to lower interest rate uncertainty and thus financial market
volatility, and represented a significant increase in central bank transparency. How-
ever, monetary policy makers always tried to emphasize the conditional character of
these future paths. The influence of these projections on long-term interest rates was
therefore rather limited (compare 11). By contrast, unconditional projections about the
future policy path may serve as a commitment device to steer longer-term rates, es-
pecially when policy rates are already very low.7 (8) define this assurance to stick to
5For a historical review of the Fed’s forward guidance, see also (9).
6The Reserve Bank of New Zealand was the first central bank to publish quantitative interest rate
projections in 1997 (see 11). Other central banks followed in providing forward guidance, as for example
the Bank of Norway in 2005 and Sveriges Riksbank in 2007.
7The Bank of Japan introduced this kind of forward guidance already in 1999, when the policy rate
was 0.15% (see 10).
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accommodative monetary policy as “Odyssean forward guidance”. In contrast, the
projection of a presumable path conditional on the future economy represents a non-
binding forward guidance that the authors refer to as “Delphic forward guidance”. All
the different designs of forward guidance implemented by the Fed since 2008 can be
classified as Odyssean forward guidance. In the following, the terms conditional and
unconditional will therefore signify the different degrees of the Fed’s Odyssean forward
guidance.
2.1 Date- and State-based Forward Guidance
In December 2008, together with the most recent rate cut, the FOMC initially commit-
ted itself to a low future level of the federal funds rate in a verbal statement. At that
time, expected inflation was too low to be consistent with the Fed’s mandate and stan-
dard monetary policy tools had lost their effectiveness. The FOMC stated that “weak
economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds
rate for some time” (see ? ).8 This warranty got strengthened in the March 2009 state-
ment by spanning “an extended period of time”.
In August 2011, the FOMC surprisingly9 introduced an explicit horizon which was
renewed and prolonged in the January and September 2012 statements (see Table 1).
The horizon always covered the next 2 to 3 years over which the FOMC expected to
not increase the target for the federal funds rate. This date-based forward guidance comes
close to an unconditional commitment to keep the policy rate at the current level and
is thus the most binding forward guidance ever issued. However, FOMC participants
expressed their concern that the press misinterpreted the date as a full commitment
(see 19).
There are advantages and disadvantages to the concept of committing to low policy
rates. On the one hand, such commitment might serve as an extensive economic stimu-
lus, especially if the commitment period is longer than expected by market participants
(compare 41).10 On the other hand, by committing to low future policy rates, the cen-
8In line with e.g. (21), exceptionally low levels are construed as the current level or range respec-
tively of the target federal funds rate.
9See (35) and (21).
10While the Fed’s policy could be viewed as an extended commitment following (41), (9) suggest that
date-based forward guidance may have also signaled either a weaker economic outlook or a change in
the policy rule of the Federal Reserve.
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Table 1 Forward Guidance at the Federal Reserve since December 2008
Dec 16, 2008 The Fed starts to provide forward guidance and projects low lev-
els of the federal funds rate “for some time”.
March 18, 2009 The Fed prolongs the horizon to “an extended period of time”.
Aug 9, 2011 Date-based forward guidance (= unconditional forward guid-
ance)
Aug 9, 11: “at least through mid-2013”
Jan 25, 12: “at least through late-2014”
Sep 13, 12: “at least through mid-2015”
Jan 25, 2012 Publication of dot projections revealing disagreement among
FOMC participants
Sep 13, 2012 Committee expects that a highly accommodative stance of mone-
tary policy will remain appropriate for a considerable time after
the economic recovery strengthens.
Dec 12, 2012 State-based forward guidance (= conditional forward guidance
linked to actual unemployment rate and inflation projections)
March 19, 2014 Extension of time horizon of forward guidance; low interest rate
levels even after employment and inflation are near mandate-
consistent levels.
Notes: This table summarizes the most important changes in forward guidance at the U.S. Federal
Reserve through FOMC Statements between December 2008 and March 2015. This paper focuses
on the shaded entries. Source: Federal Reserve System.
tral bank loses flexibility and might run into a time-inconsistency problem (see also
41): At the time when improved economic conditions would allow a rise in the policy
rate despite a still valid promise of low levels, the central bank either risks to lose cred-
ibility by deviating from its promise or an overshooting in inflation and output above
the levels consistent with the bank’s target. (32) shows that despite this overshooting
the decline in output and inflation is less extreme during crisis periods due to a re-
anchoring of inflation expectations. Furthermore, an overshooting is relatively easy to
cope with as conventional monetary policy is effective again. Yet, knowing about the
time-inconsistency, the public might not believe in the central bank’s commitment in
the first place, lowering the stimulating effect of forward guidance on the economy.
Thus, effective forward guidance is mostly a matter of central bank credibility and
public understanding (see 23).11
Soon, FOMC statements additionally became more explicit about the economic con-
11(23) further suggest that forward guidance is potentially useful if there is a commitment that is
clearly communicated and interpreted in the intended way.
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ditions warranting low future rates (see for instance the FOMC’s statement on Septem-
ber 13, 2012). As a consequence of such a policy, the public may learn about the central
bank’s reaction function, helping policy makers to regain flexibility.
In December 2012, the date-based forward guidance was then succeeded by a state-
based forward guidance that had already been discussed in January 2012 (see (19), page
14). Instead of being explicit about the horizon, the FOMC started to link a future
rise in the federal funds rate to numerical economic conditions, i.e. thresholds in un-
employment and projected inflation.12 In the same statement, the FOMC emphasized
that these thresholds are consistent with the date-based forward guidance issued be-
fore. Yet, no statement has since specified or prolonged an explicit horizon. The un-
conditional and therefore inflexible date-based forward guidance was thus somehow
replaced by a rather conditional state-based forward guidance .13
In order to provide further economic stimulus, the FOMC started in September 2012
to repeatedly affirm that the federal funds rate target would stay low “for a consider-
able time after the economic recovery strengthens”. Since March 2014, this statement
has become more explicit as the FOMC now anticipates low policy rates even after un-
employment and inflation have reached levels consistent with the Fed’s mandate (see
41).
2.2 Literature on the Effects of Forward Guidance
According to theory, central bank disclosures about future monetary policy might be-
come a focal point and crowd out private information, see (30). This might be detri-
mental to social welfare, especially when the public signal is wrong. However, (38)
shows that if public and private signals are of the same precision, welfare is higher
with a central bank providing information about its projected future policy. This strand
of the literature focuses on conditional forward guidance applied before the financial
crisis. For binding forward guidance, however, economic stimulus triggered by the
central bank can only be achieved when forward guidance translates into financial
12Specifically, unemployment should decline to 6.5 %, inflation projections at the one and two year
horizon should be between 2 - 2.5% and longer-run inflation expectations should be well-anchored be-
fore a rise in policy rates would be appropriate.
13For comparison, the (16) distinguishes four categories of forward guidance, namely pure qualitative
forward guidance, qualitative forward guidance conditional on narrative, calendar-based and outcome-
based forward guidance.
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markets’ expectations as forward guidance partially replaces standard monetary pol-
icy tools. The public forward guidance signal is therefore intended to reduce the rele-
vance of other macroeconomic information.
The empirical analysis of forward guidance typically concentrates on its level and
volatility effects on interest rate expectations, as well as on its impact on the sensitivity
of interest rates to other news. There is evidence that central bank interest rate projec-
tions conditional on the economic outlook influence market expectations and interest
rates, at least for short to medium horizons (see e.g. 29). Yet, the effect diminished
after the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 (11). (23) show that the level effect of
the Fed’s commitment to low future policy rates on interest rates and expectations up
to an horizon of 10 years was highest for the qualitative open-ended forward guid-
ance issued in December 2008 (“for some time”) and March 2009 (“extended period
of time”). However, these statements coincided with a the most recent rate cut and
the announcement of asset purchases. The response of interest rates to the introduc-
tion of date-based forward guidance in August 2011 was quite large, especially for the
two year horizon. On the day state-based forward guidance was first issued, the effect
was quite small or even positive. Yet, the authors ascribe effectiveness to state-based
forward guidance as there were also announcements on the reduction of asset pur-
chases. Futhermore, (42) find that extending the expected period of exceptionally low
policy rates by one year has a macroeconomic effect comparable to a rate cut by 15 ba-
sis points. This suggests that forward guidance can substitute conventional monetary
policy at the zero lower bound at least to some extent.
Interest rate projections should persistently affect market expectations and lower fi-
nancial market volatility. An immediate effect on the policy day with a retraction in the
following days is viewed as volatility-increasing and contradicts the spirit of central
bank transparency (see ? 11). Fresh central bank announcements on the projected fu-
ture path potentially lower interest rate uncertainty. Stale projections, by contrast, may
lead to increased volatility (see e.g. 12). Furthermore, in the case of the Fed’s binding
forward guidance, (23) show that volatility of rate expectations was lower during date-
and state-based forward guidance periods than in the period with only qualitative for-
ward guidance, especially for horizons up to two years. In particular, date-based for-
ward guidance results in lower volatility for the medium-term while volatility at the
shorter horizon is even lower in the state-based forward guidance period.
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2.2.1 The Sensitivity of Interest Rates to Macroeconomic News as a Measure of
Monetary Policy Effectiveness
(25) show that the reaction of longer-term rates to macroeconomic shocks is at odds
with macroeconomic models. These predict that short-term rates would move upon
a macroeconomic surprise but rapidly return to their steady state values afterwards.
Therefore, macroeconomic surprises should not affect long-term rates at all as long
as expectations are well anchored. In contrast to theory, the authors find evidence
that macroeconomic news also impact long-term interest rates and argue that surprises
must have led to an adjustment of the expected steady state level of inflation. The em-
pirical literature builds on this reaction pattern to identify the effectiveness of forward
guidance. In particular, if forward guidance reduces the sensitivity to macroeconomic
news, this suggests that market participants perceive forward guidance as uncondi-
tional and are less attentive to other developments.
(29) find no evidence that forward guidance lowers the market’s reaction to other
news. In particular, they detect increased responsiveness of futures rates to macroe-
conomic surprises in the period from August 2003 until December 2005, when it was
announced that policy accommodation potentially would be maintained for a consid-
erable period. The authors welcome this result as it shows that market participants are
not inattentive to developments outside the Fed.14,15 In this period, although the fed-
eral funds rate was quite low at 1%, it was still above the zero lower bound. Forward
guidance in this period was substantially weaker and more of an open-ended design
as there was still room for standard monetary policy instruments. This is different for
the forward guidance issued after reaching the zero lower bound in December 2008
when the central bank mostly relied on forward guidance as its monetary policy tool.
(39) show that interest rates along the yield curve should be less sensitive to macroe-
conomic news at the zero lower bound. This especially applies for short-term interest
rates that are insensitive to both positive and negative shocks, as long as the zero lower
bound is strongly binding with a negative shadow rate.16 The authors argue that only
large positive shocks would be able to generate a rise in the short-term rate. Thus,
14By contrast, (39) show that sensitivity of Treasury yields of three and six months significantly
shrinks during the same period.
15In the same vein, (28) find that the forward guidance of the Sveriges Riksbank did not significantly
impact the sensitivity of interest rates as market participants understood its conditionality.
16(28) support this finding for Sweden.
10
when the central bank publicly commits to keep policy rates at the zero lower bound
for a certain period, expected short-term rates within this horizon should not move
upon a shock. As longer-term rates average the actual short-term rate and the ex-
pected future path of short-term rates, this effect should spread along the yield curve.
(39) find decreased responsiveness of Treasury yields to macroeconomic surprises at
the short end of the yield curve during the zero lower bound period. While sensitivity
to macro news is highest in the beginning of 2008, it significantly declines for 3- and
6-month horizons around March 2009, when the wording “extended period of time”
expanded the horizon of presumably low interest rates and therefore strengthened for-
ward guidance.
2.3 The Relevance of Forward Guidance for the Sensitivity of
Treasury Yields
According to both theoretical and empirical literature, macroeconomic surprises
should lead to at least a short-lasting move in short-term interest rates. By contrast,
long-term interest rates should not move significantly upon macroeconomic news if
expectations are well anchored. Yet, at the zero lower bound, the reaction of short-
term rates should be reduced or not happen at all, see (39).
In the empirical analysis, I use U.S. government Treasury yields available at the Fed-
eral Reserve Board at multiple horizons from 6 months to 20 years. Figure 1 depicts the
evolution of a set of Treasury yields over the sample period from December 2008 until
March 2015. The dark shaded area represents the date-based forward guidance period,
while the state-based period begins thereafter. Short-term interest rates are rather low
and close to the zero lower bound that prevails throughout the whole sample. During
the date-based forward guidance period, interest rates of medium- to long-run matu-
rities were lower than before. Committing to low interest rates for an explicit horizon
therefore seems to be an effective forward guidance strategy to steer longer-term inter-
est rates. Yet, Figure 1 does not allow inferences about the impact of introducing state-
based forward guidance. However, longer-term rates rise in mid-2013, suggesting that
economic data indicated an upcoming lift-off. In fact, the Fed at that time announced
to reduce its asset purchase programs which led to the “2013-taper tantrum”.
For analyzing the sensitivity of Treasury yields to macroeconomic news, I use actual
11













Notes: Treasury yields at maturities 6m, 1y, 2y, 5y, 10y. Dark shaded area represents the
time period of date-based forward guidance from August 9, 2011 onwards. State-based
forward guidance started in the period thereafter, i.e. on December 12, 2012. Vertical
line represents the introduction of dot projections on January 25, 2012.
releases together with the median forecast of the RTR poll from Datastream. I compute
surprises as the difference between forecast and actual releases and normalize them
by their historical standard deviations. Following the literature (e.g. 25; 39; 35), the re-
gressions include economic surprises on output, prices and labor specifically capacity
utilization, consumer confidence, core CPI, GDP (advance), ISM manufacturing index,
leading indicators, new home sales, nonfarm payrolls, core PPI, retail sales ex. autos
and the unemployment rate. Panel A in Table 8 in the Appendix summarizes some
statistics on the set of macroeconomic surprises. While there are only 25 observations
for the quarterly release of the GDP (advance), there are 72 to 76 observations of all
other macroeconomic variables due to a monthly release schedule. As some releases
are communicated at the same day, there are 603 announcement days in the sample.
Binding forward guidance, whether conditional or unconditional, should result
in financial market participants becoming less attentive to macroeconomic news. If
forward guidance does not reduce sensitivity to macroeconomic news at all, this could
have three reasons. First, the central bank or the issued forward guidance may not
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be credible from market participants’ point of view. Second, this could imply a bad
transparency scheme of the central bank. Markets then would be unable to correctly
process the provided information (see e.g. 23). Third, markets might have already
priced in the prolonged period of low interest rates. Yet, this would involve no reason
for the Fed to insist on forward guidance as intensively as done in this period since
binding forward guidance is costly due to a loss in flexibility. In order to analyze the
effectiveness of the different strategies, I will consider the following hypotheses in the
empirical model. The first hypothesis to be tested in the model therefore reads:
Hypothesis 1: Credible binding central bank forward guidance should lead to a decreased
sensitivity of Treasury yields to macroeconomic surprises.
The sample period allows to investigate whether a potential sensitivity decreasing
effect differs between date- and state-based forward guidance. Date-based forward
guidance as pursued by the Fed is an unconditional commitment such that Treasury
yields should not be affected by any surprising macroeconomic developments if the
guidance is credible, compare (39) and (35). Specifically, if the central bank commits
itself to keep interest rates at the actual level for an explicit horizon, interest rates that
match this maturity should not significantly move upon a macroeconomic surprise.
By contrast, state-based forward guidance is a conditional commitment and linked to
unemployment and inflation projections. If a commitment is conditional on macroe-
conomic developments, market participants should be attentive to macroeconomic
surprises for the formation of expectations. Consequently, the sensitivity shrinkage
should be higher under date-based than under state-based forward guidance due to a
different level of conditionality. This is a refined approach which translates into the
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Due to its unconditionality, the sensitivity-lowering effect of date-based
forward guidance should be more pronounced than in the state-based forward guidance regime
when markets are more attentive to macroeconomic developments.
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2.3.1 Empirical Model and Results
Advancing on (39) and (35), I analyze the sensitivity of Treasury yields to macroe-
conomic news by letting the sensitivity depend on the prevailing forward guidance
design. For Treasury yields of maturities j = 6 months, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20 years, I estimate





βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet + γ
s,jDstatet ) + ε
j
t (1)
where sk are the macroeconomic surprises introduced above. Ddatet and D
state
t represent
step dummies that equal 1 in the respective time periods, see Table 1 and Figure 1. The
γ’s then determine the overall change in the yield’s sensitivity to macroeconomic news
during the date-based and state-based forward guidance period respectively.
I expect sensitivity of Treasury yields to macroeconomic news to shrink when bind-
ing forward guidance is issued, especially for the short- to medium-run. In line with
Hypothesis 1, this implies that the coefficients of date- and state-based forward guid-
ance dummies should be negative, i.e. γ < 0. Yet, as short-term rates are bounded,
one could also expect this sensitivity shrinkage to be absent in the very short-run. Since
there should be a higher importance of macroeconomic news in times of state-based
forward guidance following Hypothesis 2, the effects of the two concepts of forward
guidance are allowed to differ. Specifically I expect |γ̂d,j| > |γ̂s,j| and a significant
estimate of γd,j for longer maturities j than of γs,j.
Table 2 summarizes the results from estimating Equation 1. All significant responses
are plausibly signed. In line with (35), surprises in nonfarm payrolls and retail sales
excluding autos significantly affect interest rates along the yield curve. Note that the
base period from December 2008 until August 2011 is already a period in which short-
term interest rates are no longer sensitive to the whole set of macroeconomic news
(compare 39). Here, for instance, nonfarm payrolls significantly affect Treasury yields
except for the very short-run. Yet, there are significant effects of the ISM manufacturing
index and the advance release of GDP along the yield curve as well as of core PPI for
medium-term rates. Yet, as the period from December 2008 onwards is a period with
17The estimation results are robust to whether only announcement days or all business days are













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rather low sensitivity to macroeconomic news, some results have to be interpreted
with caution. Specifically, the test on joint significance of all βs cannot be rejected for
horizons of 6 months, 1 and 10 years; still, the R2 is just as high as in comparable
studies.
The shaded area in Table 2 shows the main coefficients of interest, namely the effect
of forward guidance on the sensitivity of Treasury yields. With γd < 0 for all horizons,
there is a sensitivity-lowering effect of date-based forward guidance throughout the
yield curve. The reaction of Treasury yields to macroeconomic surprises is thus lower
under date-based forward guidance. This effect is statistically significant for horizons
up to 5 years. Thus date-based forward guidance has a rather expansive influence as
the announced horizons only covered the next 2 or 3 years. Reasons for this could be
further announcements that low interest rates would prevail even after the economic
recovery has strengthened (41) or a strong correlation between Treasury yields of dif-
ferent maturities. The Fed’s forward guidance thus seems to be rather credible as the
public does not expect the Fed to deviate from its promise despite a time-inconsistency
problem.
State-based forward guidance only results in a sensitivity shrinkage at the short end
of the yield curve. Market participants seem to consider low policy rates as guaran-
teed for the very short-run but are attentive to macroeconomic developments for the
formation of medium- to longer-run expectations. The discrepancy in the strength of
reactions to date- and state-based forward guidance confirms their different condition-
ality. In fact, (5) find evidence that the degree of commitment decreases in December
2012. Financial market participants observe this decline in commitment and become
more attentive to macroeconomic news. The results affirm the hypotheses proposed
above and show that different forward guidance strategies represent some scope for
effective expectations management even at the zero lower bound.
3 The FOMC’s Dot Projections and Disagreement
In January 2012, the FOMC started to disclose participants’ individual assessments of
the appropriate future policy rate. These publications aim to enhance the transparency
of the Federal Reserve System and potentially increase the public’s understanding of
monetary policy (see 18). Yet, FOMC participants might disagree in their view of the
16
appropriate future path. Through the regularly published dot projections, this dis-
agreement becomes public information and might affect financial markets’ perception
of the Fed’s forward guidance and impair its effectiveness. Specifically, the reaction
of interest rates to macroeconomic surprises may become stronger in the presence of
disagreement.
After a short review of literature on disagreement within monetary policy commit-
tees, this chapter presents and discusses the FOMC’s dot projections. I further measure
the enclosed disagreement that will (in Chapter 4) augment the empirical model of
Chapter 2 in order to investigate the disagreement’s effect on interest rates’ sensitivity
and on the effectiveness of other forward guidance.
3.1 Disagreement within Monetary Policy Committees: Literature
and Background
Monetary policy committees primarily decide on the current policy rate. Yet, they
might disagree on the appropriate monetary policy. Disagreement is treated differ-
ently depending on whether decisions are taken on a majority or consensus approval.
In the first case, as for the FOMC, dissenting committee members do not prevent de-
cision making. Dissenting votes might even help to predict future policy decisions
(see (24) for the Bank of England and (36) for the Sveriges Riksbank and the Federal
Reserve).18 In contrast to (36), (15) find that central bank communication enhances
the predictability of monetary policy decisions and lowers market uncertainty if the
consensus or majority view is communicated rather than the individualistic views of
committee members. In line with this finding, there is little information about disagree-
ment among monetary policy makers although central banks have tended to increase
their transparency in recent decades.19
It seems obvious that committee members disagree not only on current monetary
policy but also on its appropriate future path. This is particularly observable in the
case of the FOMC already before the crisis. (6) classifies the FOMC’s structure as col-
legial; however, its communication tends to be individualistic with differing views
18In a committee with consensus-rule, in contrast, the role of dissenting votes differs as it involves
more discussion, an intense debate about the different opinions and efforts of persuasion.
19This particularly applies to disagreement about appropriate future monetary policy. Furthermore,
there are central banks, as for instance the RBNZ, that only have one governor and therefore full agree-
ment by definition.
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across members (see 7). While the collegial character is apparent in the actual mone-
tary policy decision, the individualistic communication essentially matters for expec-
tations management through speeches and is especially reflected in the individual as-
sessments. The FOMC already published projections for GDP, CPI and unemployment
before 2012, though in a restricted way with only range and central tendency20 rather
than individual forecasts. These projections were conditioned on each member’s as-
sessment of the monetary policy path, but the FOMC did not incorporate these in the
Summary of Economic Projections until January 2012. An underlying reason is that the
public might misinterpret these publications as specific intended policy paths. This
concern was also voiced in the discussions surrounding the introduction of dot pro-
jections when some members suggested to refrain from this kind of projections at this
time or to rather decide on a common interest rate path (see 18). Yet, to date, other
central banks as e.g. the Bank of Canada do not disclose their members’ views about
the future path at all and are therefore insufficiently transparent according to (33).
Reasons for Disagreement
There may be different reasons for FOMC participants to disagree on the appropri-
ate future interest rate path. First, participants may have a different outlook on the
economy as suggested by their economic projections. Regional Reserve Bank presi-
dents may especially be biased in decision-making towards the economic situation in
their own region. Second, the participants’ individual future interest rate paths might
depend on their voting status. As (4) outline, participants’ assessments may differ de-
pending on their voting status. If Reserve Bank presidents are voting members, they
might change their assessment of appropriate monetary policy with a bias towards the
situation in the region of the respective Reserve Bank. Third, their individual policy
reaction functions may differ. In this context, (13) examines a set of projected variables
of each participant in the Survey of Professional Forecasters in order to investigate
whether forecasters disagree on the model or on the particular scenario that will mate-
rialize. There might be further characteristics that influence participants’ view on the
appropriate current and future monetary policy. (37) show that e.g. the FOMC mem-
ber’s time spent at the Federal Reserve System is an important factor in the committee’s
decision making process.
20Central tendency is a trimmed range excluding the extreme values, i.e.the three highest and lowest
projections respectively.
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In the present study, however, these aspects cannot be covered due to the anonymity
of dot projections.21 It is not possible to link rate projections to participants’ economic
outlook or their voting status. Similarly, projections neither reveal the individual pro-
jected paths nor their adjustments from one publication to the next. One might be
concerned that the data are noisy due to participating non-voting Reserve Bank presi-
dents that cannot be distinguished from decision-making members. However, within
the horizon of projections, all members (or at least their representatives or successors)
will eventually enter the decision-making circle of the FOMC.22
(33) state different risks for monetary policy decision making by committees that
might partially apply to the assessments. They list a free rider problem and informa-
tion cascades as a variant where committee members ignore independent signals and
simply agree with other members for convenience. Furthermore, polarized committee
members might tend to extreme assessments that are either extremely cautious or risk-
taking. Therefore, actual disagreement might differ from the published dot projections.
However, it is the communicated and perceived disagreement that should matter for
the effectiveness of the Fed’s forward guidance.
Different aspects of the Fed’s dot projections have been analyzed and used in only
some studies as of yet. (? ) compared the median policy rate path to market expec-
tations. (5) use the FOMC’s dot projections to extract the degree of commitment. In
particular, they find a decrease in commitment after December 2012 when state-based
forward guidance was issued. (Morris, Stephen D.) determines which monetary policy
rule can explain FOMC’s rate projections best. Yet, this paper is the first to consider the
impact of FOMC’s disagreement about the future policy path on the effectiveness of
forward guidance and therefore closes an important gap.
3.2 The Dot Projections
At the end of 2011, the FOMC decided to incorporate individual members’ projections
of appropriate monetary policy into its Summary of Economic Projections from 2012.23
Projections would be published after every second monetary policy meeting, i.e. in
21There is a publication lag of several years for the detailed projection information.
22For some background information on the composition of participants in the quarterly projections,
refer to Appendix A.
23See (18).
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general four times a year.24
There are generally 17 participants in the regular assessment of the economy and
policy options. This number is subject to changes in the Board of Governors, see
Appendix A that offers some institutional background of the composition of FOMC
participants. In the assessments covered by this paper’s sample, there are 16 to 19
participants in each assessment.
Figure 2 FOMC Participants’ Assessments of Appropriate Monetary Policy Issued on Jan-
uary 25, 2012
Notes: Each dot indicates an FOMC participant’s assessment of the appropriate federal
funds rate target level or midpoint of target range at the end of the specified calendar year
and for the longer-run. Data is rounded to the nearest 0.25%. Source: Federal Reserve
System - FOMC Summary of Economic Projections.
Figure 2 depicts the first publication of individual assessments issued in January
2012. In every assessment, participants are asked about the appropriate pace of policy
firming. Dots indicate the appropriate target level or midpoint of the target range for
the federal funds rate at the end of the respective year and for the longer-run according
to the assessment of every individual participant. The longer-run projections assume
24In general, assessments are provided after monetary policy meetings in March, June, September
and December; except for 2012 when there were five publications in January, April, June, September
and December.
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that the federal funds rate will converge to this rate under appropriate monetary policy
and that no further shocks hit the economy. They can thus be interpreted as the interest
rate that is believed to prevail in the steady state.
While all participants viewed a future rise in the policy rate as appropriate (see
longer-run), 6 out of 17 participants preferred to not increase the federal funds rate
target until at least late 2014. 11 participants regarded low levels of 1% and below as
adequate to the projected economic situation within this horizon. This is somehow
in line with the date-based forward guidance issued on the same day which projects
exceptionally low interest rates through late 2014. None of the FOMC participants ex-
pected a return to normal conditions in the very near future. Especially in due consid-
eration of gradualism in the adjustment of interest rates, Figure 2 suggests that steady
state conditions will not be achieved before 2016 in the opinion of participants.
Disagreement
While dots are quite dense for the shortest horizon, they spread out over time. Reasons
for rather little disagreement about the appropriate level at the end of the current year
may include gradualism and in particular the commitment to a low federal funds rate
that was supported by nearly all decision-making members at this meeting.25 While
the bulk of dots is located between 0.25% and 1% for the next three years, some par-
ticipants expected that a substantial rise in future interest rates is already reasonable
within this horizon. Specifically, 6 participants seem to not agree on the date-based
forward guidance. If this promise means to stay at the current policy rate level, only 6
will fully agree with the issued date-based forward guidance.
In contrast, disagreement on the longer-run path of interest rates seems to be less
pronounced. Thus, participants have rather similar views on the steady state level of
the policy rate. Yet, there is still some disagreement on how to achieve policy goals
in the longer-run. Their individual policy reaction functions may differ and there is
also some disagreement among FOMC participants on the optimal longer-run values
of output and unemployment (see FOMC Summary of Projections).
25In fact, Jeffrey M. Lacker voted against the FOMC monetary policy action on January 25, 2012 as
he did not agree with providing the explicit time period (“through late 2014”) of an exceptionally low
federal funds rate, see (19).
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Development of projections over time
In the period between January 25, 2012 and March 30, 2015, there were 14 assessments,
6 of which (September and December projections) include a prolonged horizon of up
to 4 years (see Figure 5 in Appendix). The (dis)agreement pattern observed in Figure
2 is in general consistent with subsequent dot projection publications; i.e. there is
lower disagreement in the short-term (end of current year) as well as in the longer-
run while disagreement is larger at intermediate horizons. This partly contrasts with
private sector forecasters that also rather agree on the policy rate in the near term,
while there is high disagreement about average short-term rates at long horizons for 6
to 11 years, see (1). Yet, their understanding of those long-run expectations may rather
differ from the longer-run or steady state level that policy makers are asked to assess
in their projections.
In the respective December projections (Panels d, h, l in Figure 5), there is no disagree-
ment on the rate at the end of the current year indicating that there is no other review
of the federal funds rate target scheduled for the rest of the year. The end-of-this-year
target is therefore seen as guaranteed, aside from unscheduled decisions that could
be taken. Yet, participants could still see a higher interest rate as appropriate imply-
ing that they disagree with the decision on the current policy rate.26 Another striking
feature of Figure 5 is that in 2013 there is no disagreement about the respective end-
of-year rate already in the September projection. FOMC participants potentially felt
committed to the unconditional forward guidance that had been issued or foresaw the
targeted variables as far from mandate-consistent levels and thus somehow already
agreed on the next monetary policy step.
The longer run projections refer to normal economic conditions and thus to the steady
state that FOMC participants have in mind. In the first half of 2012, the longer-run
seems to correspond to an uncertain point in time (or at least far ahead) for all partici-
pants. However, already from September 2012 on, there is an overlap of projected rates
for the end of 2015 and for the longer-run. Thus, some participants viewed late-2015
26One could attempt to draw conclusions from the voting and the minutes. For instance, in the
September 2012 projection, 18 of the 19 participants agree on an end-of-2012 target rate of 25 basis
points while one person views an end-of-year rate of 50 basis points as appropriate. In the December
2012 decision on the target rate, one person voted against the Fed action to leave the target rate un-
changed. However, a direct conclusion cannot be drawn, since participants might change their mind
and the participant that disagreed in September might have been a non-voting participant. At least, the
composition of participants did not change in the meantime.
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as constituting a return to longer-run conditions.27 Thenceforward, there is in general
an overlap of dots at explicit and longer-run horizons implying that the steady state is
expected to be achieved within that explicit time frame.
I now examine the evolution of the median projected path over time.28 In the following,
eoy0 refers to the current projection for end of this year, eoy1 for the end of next year
and eoy2 as well as eoy3 for the end of subsequent years, respectively. lr represents the
longer-run or steady state projection. Panel (a) in Figure 3 displays the evolution of
median projections at the different horizons. There are four continuous lines for the
horizons eoy0, eoy1, eoy2 and lr. FOMC participants’ assessments appear to be consis-
tent over time. The projection for the end of the current year eoy0 continuously lies at
25 basis points until September 2014, when the median FOMC participant projects the
federal funds rate to even decline to 12.5 basis points.29 Yet, in March 2015, the median
short-term projection increases to 62.5 basis points. This is in line with the eoy1 projec-
tions that has been issued earlier: the median of eoy1 already increases in March 2014.
Similarly, the median of the eoy2 projection starts to increase already in March 2013.
The eoy2 projection is further characterized by some seasonality with projected rates
declining in the assessments at the end of the year. The median participant seems to
revise his projection downwards, possibly because the current economic outlook has
worsened.
Subsidiary observations about the longer-run
Both Figure 5 in the Appendix as well as Panel (a) in Figure 3 indicate that the per-
ceived appropriate longer-run or steady state level of the target federal funds rate
changes over time. Between mid-2012 and mid-2014, the median for lr declines from
4.25% to 3.75%. This could be due to participants modifying their policy reaction func-
tion or adjusting their long-term goals for output and unemployment. As longer-run
projections for inflation remained at 2%, this implies a decline in the equilibrium real
rate that is in line with other official forecasts, compare (? ).
27In the projection issued in June 2012, one end-of-2014 projection coincides with a longer-run pro-
jection. However, these dots could refer to different participants.
28As the decision-making process in the committee is rather collegial (see 6) and due to typical interest
rate cuts and rises by multiple of 25 basis points, votes for the current policy rate target would always
end up in a choice for the median rather than the mean.
29An important reason for this downward move is that the FOMC rounds projections to the nearest
0.125% instead of 0.25% starting with the September 2014 meeting, see Figure 5.
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Notes: (a) Median, (b) standard deviation, (c) range and (d) interquartile range for dot pro-
jections at horizons eoy0, eoy1, eoy2 as well as for the longer-run, lr for the sample period
from January 25, 2012 until March 18, 2015. Vertical lines represent the last projection in
each calender year. Source: Federal Reserve System - FOMC Summary of Economic Pro-
jections and author’s calculations.
As projections ask for the appropriate path of monetary policy rates, one would
expect that future rates gradually adjust until the steady state level is reached. Yet,
in the September 2014 projection, it is certain that one participant’s assessment of the
appropriate policy rate was higher for 2017 than for the longer-run.30 This participant
30This could have been the case as well between September 2012 and June 2016 (except for the June
2013 projection), but one cannot infer this from the dots.
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seems to favor the policy suggested by (41). This policy implies keeping interest rates
at low levels for horizons longer than necessary, while accepting an overshooting in
inflation and output that has to be corrected for by a policy rate target above the steady
state rate.
Interestingly, there is at least some overlap of longer-run interest rates projections
and the longest definite projection horizon from September 2012 on, signaling an im-
provement of economic conditions. Yet, it is astonishing that there is a single exception
for the June 2013 projection as the Fed signaled greater optimism in its statement of the
respective meeting (see 20) and a possible tapering of quantitative easing. Yet, it was
emphasized that the “highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain
appropriate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends”31.
3.3 Measuring Disagreement
The heterogeneity in dot projections can be interpreted as the aggregate disagree-
ment among FOMC participants and can be measured in different ways. Due to the
anonymity of dots, disagreement is measured within each cross-section at each point
in time.32 This gives one value of disagreement for each horizon after every second
meeting. Although some FOMC participants might reveal changes in opinion through
speeches in the meantime, one can hardly infer a change in the overall disagreement
from them. Thus, I assume disagreement to be constant between two disclosures of
projections and financial markets to perceive this current level of disagreement to be
still valid.
The range provides a plain measure of disagreement. However, it gives a dispropor-
tionate role to outliers while there is no information about the disagreement among the
remaining members. Dissenting votes in current monetary policy decisions are quite
usual (see 36), yet they do not prevent decisions from being taken if adopted by major-
ity approval as in the case of the FOMC. Second moments such as the cross-sectional
standard deviation are a comprehensive measure of all votes and assign the same weight
to all dots. Yet, the standard deviation describes the distribution of votes around the
31See (20).
32By contrast, (4) use the degree of disagreement by individual members instead of the aggregate
disagreement as the full data set for FOMC projections on GDP, CPI and unemployment for the period
between 1992 and 1998 got disclosed with a lag of ten years.
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mean while monetary policy makers would rather base their decision on the median.
Therefore, quantile-based measures such as the interquartile range as for instance used
in (26) and (2) seem to be more adequate. The interquartile range is defined as the dif-
ference between the 75th and the 25th percentiles of a distribution, Q0.75 and Q0.25, thus
IQR = Q0.75 − Q0.25. This measure is centered around the median and trims extreme
votes that are likely to dissent in upcoming policy decisions.
Table 3 Disagreement Pattern along the Horizon
eoy0 eoy1 eoy2 eoy3 longer run
Obs. 14 14 14 6 14
Horizon in months
(min - max) 0.5 - 11 12.5 - 23 24.5 - 35 36.5 - 39.5 -
avg. std. dev. 0.14 0.53 0.92 0.98 0.30
avg. range 0.52 1.87 3.04 3.44 1.09
avg. IQR 0.02 0.40 1.03 1.13 0.30
Notes: This table summarizes the average evolution of participants’ assessments along the hori-
zon for the period between January 25, 2012 until March 18, 2015 covering 14 disclosures of dot
projections.
Table 3 shows some summary statistics about the dot projections for the different
horizons. Aside from eoy3, all horizons are disclosed in the 14 regular projections that
were issued over the sample period. The shortest projected horizon is half a month
(mid-December projection for the end of the year, eoy0); the longest projection horizon
is almost 40 months and is covered in every September issue, when the horizon of dot
projections is extended by another calendar year. Since FOMC participants project the
target rate for the end of the following calendar years, the horizon of projections is
not constant and depends on the date of each monetary policy meeting within a year.
Thus, for instance horizon eoy0 varies from half a month to 11 months.
Disagreement increases along horizons
Table 3 further lists the average disagreement based on the three measures along the
horizons for the publications between January 2012 and March 2015. Confirming the
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observations of Figure 5, disagreement is small in the short-run (eoy0)33 and increases
with the horizon for all three measures. Yet, for the longer-run assessment, disagree-
ment is again lower. The increase of disagreement along the horizon is also revealed
in panels (b) to (d) of Figure 3 that depict the evolution over time of the three disagree-
ment measures for horizons eoy0, eoy1 and eoy2. Measures seem to be characterized by
some seasonality with disagreement decreasing towards the end of the year. This is
particularly apparent for range and standard deviation of projections over short hori-
zons. The most likely reason for this is that the actual horizon of projections varies
over the year, see Table 3. In general, the disagreement pattern of range and standard
deviation looks quite similar while the evolution of IQR over time differs. This is also
supported by the respective correlations between disagreement measures at different
horizons (see Table 4).
Table 4 Correlation of Disagreement Measures
eoy0 eoy1 eoy2
sd range iqr sd range iqr sd range iqr
std. dev. 1.00 1.00 1.00
range 0.99 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.80 1.00
IQR 0.62 0.62 1.00 0.79 0.68 1.00 0.38 -0.09 1.00
Notes: Correlation between different disagreement measures (standard deviation sd, range and
interquartile range iqr) at the three horizons, eoy0, eoy1 and eoy2.
There is no disagreement on the policy rate for the end of the current year in each
December policy meeting for all measures. The interquartile range for that horizon
(eoy0) is actually continuously equal to zero until 2014. This illustrates that at least half
of the policy makers agree on the future policy path in the short-run while standard
deviation and range reveal the presence of some outliers. Those participants favor
an increase in the target federal funds rate within the current year. Furthermore, the
interquartile range for eoy1 is rather low during the 2013 policy meetings while it is
substantially higher in the meetings at the beginning of 2012 and since 2014. There-
fore, assuming that participants’ policy reaction functions did not change substantially
within that period and were fairly similar across participants, this implies rather close
economic outlooks of participants from September 2012 until December 2013.
33This is in line with (4) who investigate FOMC projections on GDP, CPI and unemployment for the
period from 1992 until 1998.
27
A vast difference in measures becomes apparent in March 2013. While the range
of the projected federal funds rate target almost 3 years (eoy2) ahead is 4.25, the in-
terquartile range is only 0.75. In fact, most of the participants agreed on a projected
target between 0.5% and 1.25% while some participants viewed an increase of the tar-
get to up to 4.5% as appropriate (see also Figure 5 Panel (e) in the Appendix).
Choice of horizons studied
Due to the absence of disagreement for eoy0 in the December and some September pro-
jections as well as the infrequent publication of eoy3 horizons, the analysis in Chapter
4 will provide the results for horizons eoy1 and eoy2. This is also in line with the time
dimensions of forward guidance issued within the FOMC Statement, as eoy1 and eoy2
mostly cover the date-based forward guidance horizon of 2 - 3 years.34 As demon-
strated in Chapter 2, date-based forward guidance foresaw low interest rates through
late 2014, when dot projections were first provided in January 2012. This horizon was
prolonged to mid-2015 in the statement of September 2012. When state-based forward
guidance came into effect in December 2012, the FOMC emphasized that this was in
line with the mid-2015 horizon. Indeed, with date-based forward guidance succeeded
by state-based forward guidance, the FOMC never redeemed this explicit horizon. As
eoy2 is only covered by the date-based horizon for the data until 2013, it seems best to
measure disagreement based on participants’ projections for the end of next year, eoy1.
The next chapter augments the empirical model of Chapter 2 by the interquartile
range for eoy1 in order to investigate the impact of disagreement on the effectiveness
of forward guidance. The analysis thus examines the impact of disagreement on the
policy rate target at the end of next year on the information content and credibility of
forward guidance. Results for horizon eoy2 as well as for range and standard deviation
are provided in the appendix and will serve as robustness checks.
34In September and December 2012, the date-based horizon is also covered by eoy3. Furthermore, in
March 2015, the mid-2015 horizon is only covered by eoy0.
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4 Forward Guidance under Disagreement
Finally, I augment the empirical model from Chapter 2 with a measure of disagree-
ment and analyze the consequences of disagreement for the Fed’s forward guidance.
Specifically, this chapter investigates the influence of disagreement among FOMC par-
ticipants on the sensitivity of Treasury yields to macroeconomic news and allows this
effect to be different for date- and state-based forward guidance.
4.1 Empirical Model and Results
(23) point out that monetary policy committees such as the FOMC might impair the
effectiveness of forward guidance as compromises on a future interest rate track might
weaken the credibility and clarity of the central bank’s commitment. However, if the
public explicitly gets to know about the FOMC’s actual disagreement on the future
policy path, the information content of binding forward guidance should decline like-
wise. As observed in Figure 2, on the day when date-based forward guidance in the
FOMC’s statement was extended to late-2014, only 6 participants agreed on the cur-
rent level of the target federal funds rate to be appropriate within that horizon. This
could impair the strength and effectiveness of forward guidance. Market participants
might perceive the commitment character of central bank’s projections as less credible
and therefore use other information to form expectations. For the period since Jan-
uary 2012, when the Federal Reserve started to publish the dot projections, forward
guidance should therefore be investigated in connection with this disagreement infor-
mation.35
If disagreement impairs the effectiveness of forward guidance, market participants
should again be more attentive to other information such as macroeconomic news.
While this paper found a sensitivity shrinkage during the forward guidance periods,
the sensitivity should rise again when policy makers do not agree on that specific
forward guidance. Therefore, I propose the third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The sensitivity of Treasury yields to macroeconomic news should depend on
the level of disagreement and increase with higher levels thereof.
35The Fed only started disclosing dot projections within the period of date-based forward guidance,
such that part of this period (August 2011 - January 2012) goes without information on disagreement.
29
As shown in Chapter 2, the two forward guidance strategies of different strengths
have different effects on the sensitivity of Treasury yields. Similarly to the rationale
behind Hypothesis 2, one expects this effect to differ with the commitment character
of forward guidance. Disagreement should especially impair the effectiveness of
unconditional forward guidance, i.e. heighten sensitivity in times of date-based
forward guidance. The fourth hypothesis thus reads:
Hypothesis 4: The sensitivity shrinkage of Treasury yields to macroeconomic news should
be less pronounced the higher the disagreement among policy makers. Due to different
effectiveness of forward guidance strategies, sensitivity should particularly be restored during
the date-based forward guidance period.
In order to account for the impact of disagreement, I allow the sensitivity of Treasury
yields to further depend on a disagreement measure introduced above. Specifically, I
use the interquartile range from FOMC dot projections at the end of next year, eoy1.
Due to the quarterly publication scheme of projections, this horizon varies from 12
to 23 months and is covered by date-based forward guidance at least until the end
of 2014 (compare Table 1). I augment the empirical model from Chapter 2.3.1 by this





βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet + γ
s,jDstatet
+ δd,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet ) + ε
j
t (2)
where DAt is the disagreement measure of dot projections published at every second
monetary policy meeting. DAt equals zero before the introduction of dot projections
and is assumed to be constant until the next publication. Hypothesis 3 implies that
the respective coefficients should be positive (δ > 0) as a high level of disagreement
should lower the impact of forward guidance. In other words, the sensitivity of Trea-
36Including the non-interacted variables following (34) does not alter the main results of this analysis.
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sury yields to macroeconomic news should be higher under disagreement on the ap-
propriate future path than in the case of forward guidance under full agreement. Yet,
Hypothesis 4 suggests that the effect of disagreement is different under the two for-
ward guidance schemes. Specifically, disagreement should be more detrimental when
date-based forward guidance is issued, i.e. |δd,j| > |δs,j|.
Accounting for disagreement in Equation 2 hardly alters the β coefficients for the
sensitivity to macroeconomic news in a significant way, see Table 9 in the Appendix.37
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the forward guidance and disagreement pa-
rameters of Equation 2. In the case of no disagreement the impact of forward guid-
ance is fully captured by the γ-coefficients in the upper panel of the table.38 If there
is disagreement, the effect of forward guidance on the sensitivity of interest rates is
composed of γ plus δ multiplied by the actual level of disagreement, DAt.
In the short- to medium-run, results for the γ-coefficients do not qualitatively change
compared to Table 2. For the longer-run, however, date-based forward guidance still
has a significant effect that does not even decline with maturity. Thus, if there is no
disagreement on the appropriate future policy within the FOMC, date-based forward
guidance is highly credible and affects the whole yield curve.39 The fact that coeffi-
cients do not decline for longer-term maturities also points to a rather high correla-
tion in longer-term rates. For the same period, if disagreement is high, the sensitivity
shrinkage is less pronounced than in the case of no disagreement. For the short-run (up
to one year maturity), however, disagreement about the appropriate rate at end of next
year does not impair the credibility of the short-run commitment to low interest rates.
Markets seem to take the actual low policy rate as guaranteed for up to one year and
are hardly attentive to macroeconomic news. Disagreement in case of the date-based
forward guidance especially matters for the medium- to long-run. If FOMC members
disagree about the future appropriate path (IQR between 0 and 0.75), this may lead
market participants to be even more attentive to news compared to the base period
(see longer-term horizons from 5 years on).
In the case of state-based communication, forward guidance under full agreement
37Merely news in core producer prices do now significantly impact Treasury yields of also longer
horizons.
38As there were no dot projections before January 2012, DAt is assumed to be zero. Measuring DAt
by the interquartile range, there is full agreement during 2012 Q4 and 2013 Q3, Q4.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































especially matters for horizons up to 2 years. Yet, disagreement increases the sensi-
tivity of Treasury yields for the medium-run (2 and 3 year maturity). For the 3 year
maturity, this means that disagreement also leads to increased sensitivity, as becomes
clear from the lack of a significant effect of state-based forward guidance, γs, 3y. The
results are in line with Hypothesis 3, especially for the date-based forward guidance
period, and therefore in turn confirm Hypothesis 4.
My results are robust to the choice of the disagreement measure (see Chapter 3.3)
as well as of the horizon (eoy1 and eoy2). For comparison, the whole set of results for
range, standard deviation and the different horizons is reported in Tables 9 to 14 in
the Appendix. In line with my main findings, disagreement affects interest rates of
medium to longer maturities in the date-based forward guidance period. In the state-
based forward guidance period, by contrast, the impact of disagreement only applies
for a horizon of 6 months or none when using alternative measures of disagreement.
The analysis above shows that including disagreement is important for considering
the credibility of forward guidance and the corresponding effect on the sensitivity of
Treasury yields to macroeconomic news. While the β coefficients throughout the yield
curve and the γs at least for the short-run are robust to the inclusion of disagreement,
it can have detrimental effects for medium- to longer-term rates. Furthermore, dis-
agreement in times of binding forward guidance might impede forward guidance at
horizons above one year. Although disclosing dot projections may help the public un-
derstand the FOMC’s reaction function, this measure of forward guidance is costly for
other types of issued forward guidance and their credibility.
Increased transparency in form of the dot projections reduces the information con-
tent of forward guidance if policy makers disagree. Yet, the interpretation of this result
is twofold. On the one hand, disagreement weakens the credibility and strength of
forward guidance and therefore might harm this policy measure that the Fed relies
on in times of exceptionally low policy rates. On the other hand, market participants
learn about the central bank’s policy reaction function and rationally form interest rate
expectations by considering available information on macroeconomic developments.
Furthermore, the Fed was able to attenuate its strong commitment by the issuance of
dot projections and the disagreement therein. This will be crucial if the economic situ-
ation leads the Fed to deviate from its promise and the public demands accountability.
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4.2 The Role of Policy Uncertainty
As argued by (39) and (35), monetary policy uncertainty may affect the sensitivity of in-
terest rates to macroeconomic news. One could raise concern that disagreement within
the FOMC merely reflects general monetary policy uncertainty or in a broader sense
economic policy uncertainty. Therefore, I check the robustness of the above results to
including a news-based index of economic policy uncertainty for the U.S. This index
follows the methodology developed by (3) and quantifies the number of newspaper
articles on a given day that contain specific terms as for instance economy, uncertainty
or federal reserve.40











2012 2013 2014 2015
Notes: Policy uncertainty index and disagreement measured by the interquartile range
of dot projections for the end of next year (dashed line), eoy1, for the sample period from
January 25, 2012 until March 30, 2015. Source: http://www.policyuncertainty.com/
us_daily.html and own calculations from Chapter 3.3.
Figure 4 depicts the evolution of the index together with disagreement as measured
by the interquartile range of dot projections at the end of next year, eoy1. The uncer-
tainty index reveals higher values between spring 2012 and spring 2013 and is gener-
ally lower in the period thereafter. Specifically, policy uncertainty is highest around
40The index is taken from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_daily.html.
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the introduction of state-based forward guidance in December 2012. By contrast, dis-
agreement about the future monetary policy was zero at that time. Thus, policy makers
seem to agree more on keeping interest rates low when economic uncertainty is high,
especially in these times of exceptionally low policy rates. While policy uncertainty de-
creases over the whole sample, disagreement is highest in the last year of the dataset.
Actually, policy uncertainty is negatively correlated with all disagreement measures.
Disagreement should therefore not result from policy uncertainty according to this in-
dex.
In order to check the robustness of the results in Chapter 4.1 to the inclusion of policy
uncertainty, I now augment the model in Equation 2 by the above index for the dot
projections period and let the sensitivity of interest rates jointly depend on this index




βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet + γ
s,jDstatet
+ δd,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet + η j pt · Ddotst ) + ε
j
t (3)
where Ddots = 1 in the sample period starting on January 25, 2012 and zero in the
previous period.
Table 6 shows the estimation results for the main coefficients of interest in Equation
3.41 For all horizons but 6 months, η is statistically insignificant and explanatory power
remains rather constant. Consequently, there are only slight numerical changes in the
estimated coefficients which do not harm the main results from the previous subsec-
tion. The estimates for both the effects of forward guidance (γ) and disagreement (δ)
are in line with the previous findings for all maturities.
Yet, policy uncertainty influences the sensitivity of treasury yields in the short-run.
Although one would expect higher uncertainty to lead to increased sensitivity, η fea-
tures a negative sign. Thus, market participants seem to believe in guaranteed low
interest rates even more strongly in times of high economic uncertainty, at least for
the very short-run. As forward guidance and dot projections are in fact meant to in-
fluence the medium- to long-run expectations, this particular result is of rather little

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































importance to this analysis.
Overall, the core findings about the impact of disagreement on the effectiveness of
forward guidance are robust to the inclusion of economic policy uncertainty. Thus,
disagreement about the future course of monetary policy should not be mistaken for
policy uncertainty. Disagreement among policy makers in contrast is an important
factor when investigating the information content of forward guidance.
4.3 Asymmetric Sensitivity at the Zero Lower Bound
With interest rates close to the zero lower bound, the sensitivity may differ with the
sign and size of macroeconomic surprises. Specifically, surprises that are expected
to decrease interest rates might result in rather weak reactions, or none at all, when
interest rates are already close to zero and a lower bound is a binding constraint. Rate-
increasing macroeconomic surprises, by contrast, would still lead to an increase in
interest rates. Forward guidance - as issued by the FOMC since the crisis - is intended
to keep interest rates low along the yield curve and is thus particularly oriented to-
wards reducing the sensitivity to rate-increasing surprises. Consequently, the effects
of forward guidance and disagreement among policy makers on the sensitivity of in-
terest rates to news could be different. This asymmetry may thus impact the results in
Chapter 4.1.42 While forward guidance in general shrank and policy makers’ disagree-
ment restored sensitivity, I expect forward guidance and disagreement to be especially
influential in case of rate-increasing surprises.
I therefore distinguish between surprises that are expected to lead to either a rate in-
crease or a decrease, i.e. sk+ and sk−, and allow for different influences of forward
guidance (γ+ and γ−) and disagreement (δ+ and δ−) on the sensitivity of interest
rates.43 The effect of forward guidance and disagreement on the sensitivity of inter-
est rates should differ with the sign of surprises due to rates’ proximity to the zero
lower bound.
42As (39) emphasize, the sensitivity of short-term interest rates to macroeconomic news can still be
symmetric if the shadow rate is negative (compare 42) in presence of a strongly binding zero lower
bound. Only large rate-increasing surprises would then result in a response of interest rates.
43Essentially, in this dataset, all positive macroeconomic surprises short of unemployment are ex-
pected to involve a rate increase. There are 275 announcement days with only surprises that would
imply a rate increase and 244 days with rate-decreasing surprises; the remaining 84 represent days with
both rate-increasing and -decreasing surprises.
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Table 7 shows the results for the differentiated γ- and δ-coefficients based on Equa-
tion 2. As noted above, the base-period until mid-2011 is already a period with low
sensitivity to macroeconomic news. This is essentially true for the rate-decreasing sur-
prises, as can be seen in the test result on joint significance of those surprises while
the rate-increasing surprises are jointly significant throughout the yield curve. Dif-
ferentiating between rate-increasing and -decreasing surprises also results in higher
explanatory power for all horizons.
In line with intuition, the main results of this paper (see 4.1) are especially valid for
the rate-increasing surprises (see upper panel of Table 7). Date-based forward guid-
ance significantly reduces sensitivity of interest rates across all maturities, while the
more conditional state-based forward guidance only matters for horizons up to the
medium-term. Disagreement is mainly important for the medium- to longer-term rates
for the sample under date-based forward guidance.
As expected, the results for the rate-decreasing surprises contrast with the results of
Chapter 4.1 (see lower panel of Table 7). Results for the short- to medium-run became
generally less significant. The slightly significant effects of date-based forward guid-
ance, γd−, and disagreement during that period, δd−, in the longer-run estimations
reveal wrong signs; yet, as the β−s are only slightly significant, one should not draw
conclusions from this.
This chapter therefore concludes that forward guidance and thus also policy makers’
disagreement thereon essentially matter for rate-increasing surprises.
5 Conclusion
Forward guidance is an essential tool for the effectiveness of monetary policy. Espe-
cially since the crisis, the importance of managing financial market expectations has
increased due to the presence of the zero lower bound. Yet, for forward guidance to
be effective, a central bank’s credibility is crucial, especially if the guidance conveys a
commitment. If a central bank’s forward guidance does not affect financial markets’
expectations, this could either mean that markets already expect what the central bank
projects44, that markets do not believe in those projections or that the guidance lacks




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This paper shows that forward guidance as issued by the Federal Reserve since 2011
was an effective tool to influence interest rates. Financial markets believed in the cen-
tral bank’s promise to keep interest rates at low levels and were therefore less attentive
to other macroeconomic news. However, the decrease in sensitivity of interest rates
to macroeconomic news was less pronounced when guidance was linked to explicit
conditions.
In 2012 when FOMC participants started to disclose dot projections, financial mar-
kets learned about the disagreement among policy makers on the future path of inter-
est rates. The publication of a disagreement signal can have detrimental effects on how
forward guidance is perceived by markets. In line with this intuition, I find that the
effectiveness of forward guidance was lowered by disagreement implying that market
participants were again more attentive to macroeconomic news. Yet, this can be inter-
preted in two ways. On the one hand, forward guidance is less effective as financial
markets do not see the low rate as guaranteed. On the other hand, before introducing
dot projections, the FOMC was concerned that markets interpret forward guidance as
a full commitment. Therefore, by the publication of disagreement, the FOMC managed
to weaken any such interpretation. While the Fed was able to reduce interest rates also
at the longer end of the yield curve by providing an unconditional policy rate path
through date-based forward guidance, it regained flexibility by implementing other
forward guidance measures such as state-based forward guidance and dot projections.
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Appendices
Appendix A: The Participants in the Individual Assessments
The FOMC consists of the Board of Governors (5 members in general), the president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as well as four Reserve Bank Presidents on
a rotating basis with one-year terms. Nonvoting presidents participate in the meeting,
but they are not allowed to vote on actual policy decisions, although they can influence
the decision-making process. Yet, individual assessments about the appropriate future
policy rate are given by the members of the FOMC as well as by alternate members and
attendant non-voting regional Reserve Bank presidents. Overall, there are generally 17
participants in the regular assessment of the economy and policy options. This number
is subject to changes in the Board of Governors. In the assessments covered by this
paper’s sample, there are 16 to 19 participants in each assessment. Specifically, the
Board of Governors consisted of 7 members instead of 5 between May 2012 and June
2013. Furthermore, after Janet L. Yellen took office as Chair of the Board of Governors
in February 2014, there were only four members in the BoG.
While there is at least an annual change in the composition of the FOMC due to
the rotating voting status of regional Reserve Bank presidents, there is more continu-
ity in the composition of the participants in the economic projections.There are three
members that did not even change their function throughout the whole sample, two
of which have voting status. FOMC Vice Chair William C. Dudley (President of New
York Fed) and the respective alternate member Catherine M. Cumming (1st Vice Presi-
dent of New York Fed) as well as Daniel K. Tarullo, member of the Board of Governors.
Janet L. Yellen was a member of the FOMC throughout the sample although her sta-
tus changed from regular Board member to the Chair position in February 2014 when
she succeeded Ben Bernanke. While there were some changes in the composition of
the Board of Governors, there was only one change in the group of regional Reserve
Bank presidents. President Sandra Pianalto of the Federal Reserve of Cleveland was
succeeded by Loretta J. Mester in May 2014. Furthermore, three regional Reserve Bank
Presidents designated the respective vice presidents as their representatives, yet, only
when they held non-voting status. All other presidents of the regional Reserve Banks
held their position as president throughout the sample, but changed their status within
the FOMC meeting (voting, alternate, non-voting). Yet, also a non-voting member can
41
try to steer the decision-making process of the FOMC and relate his or her own assess-
ment to the region’s requirements.
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Figure 5 Dot Projections
(a) April 25, 2012
(b) June 20, 2012
(c) September 13, 2012
(d) December 12, 2012
45
Figure 5: Dot Projections continued
(e) March 20, 2013
(f) June 19, 2013
(g) September 18, 2013
(h) December 18, 2013
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Figure 5: Dot Projections continued
(i) March 19, 2014
(j) June 18, 2014
(k) September 17, 2014
(l) December 17, 2014
47
Figure 5: Dot Projections continued
(m) March 18, 2015
Notes: Dot projections from the Summaries of Projections in (a)-(d) 2012, (e)-(h) 2013,
(i)-(l) 2014 as well as of (m) March 2015. Each dot indicates the appropriate level in the
view of an individual participant at the end of the specified calendar year or for the
longer-run respectively. Data is rounded to the nearest 0.25% or 0.125% since Septem-
ber 2014 respectively. Source: Federal Reserve System - FOMC Summary of Economic
Projections.
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Table 9 The Effect of Forward Guidance under Disagreement (iqr for eoy1) on Treasury
Yields
6months 1year 2years 3years 5years 10years 20years
Capacity 0.21 -0.09 0.51 0.58 0.22 -0.30 -0.42
utilization (0.18) (0.23) (0.36) (0.37) (0.47) (0.42) (0.35)
Consumer 0.01 -0.08 0.38 0.40 0.57 0.65 0.84*
confidence (0.12) (0.32) (0.50) (0.45) (0.52) (0.41) (0.43)
core CPI
-0.36 -0.19 -0.72 -0.61 -0.78 -0.78 -0.61
(0.27) (0.37) (0.63) (0.60) (0.76) (0.75) (0.62)
GDP advance
0.32* 0.10 1.10* 1.69* 2.16** 2.47** 2.46**
(0.17) (0.15) (0.61) (0.94) (1.06) (1.14) (1.13)
ISM index
0.39** 0.06 0.29 0.67 1.13* 1.3* 1.28*
(0.17) (0.25) (0.63) (0.58) (0.67) (0.70) (0.67)
Leading -0.13 0.00 0.37 0.50 0.40 0.42 0.18
indicators (0.20) (0.15) (0.44) (0.61) (0.87) (0.91) (0.85)
New homes
0.21 0.01 0.05 -0.05 -0.18 -0.21 -0.16
(0.19) (0.20) (0.36) (0.41) (0.47) (0.39) (0.38)
Nonfarm 0.77* 2.53*** 5.89*** 5.36*** 5.47*** 3.77*** 3.47***
payrolls (0.43) (0.86) (2.02) (1.91) (1.67) (1.07) (0.92)
Core PPI
0.16 0.49 1.78** 2.48** 3.02** 3.35*** 4.04***
(0.16) (0.41) (0.79) (1.03) (1.18) (1.13) (1.31)
Retail sales 0.19 0.36* 0.63 1.33** 1.89** 2.05*** 2.04***
ex. autos (0.13) (0.20) (0.46) (0.57) (0.80) (0.73) (0.73)
Unemployment
0.16 0.24 0.54 0.89 1.02 0.80 0.73
(0.22) (0.48) (1.05) (0.96) (0.99) (0.70) (0.62)
-0.82*** -0.86*** -0.97*** -0.89*** -0.82*** -0.72*** -0.76***
γd: Date (0.13) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.18) (0.16)
-1.63*** -0.79*** -0.64*** -0.24 0.19 0.53 0.56
γs: State
(0.37) (0.12) (0.21) (0.34) (0.43) (0.47) (0.44)
1.21 0.06 0.40** 0.92** 2.14*** 4.12*** 4.61***
δd: DA (Date) (0.83) (0.20) (0.18) (0.42) (0.80) (1.33) (1.38)
0.99 0.51 1.02** 1.21* 0.64 0.17 -0.07
δs: DA (State)
(0.60) (0.49) (0.48) (0.63) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56)
H0 : β = 0 0.14 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02
R2 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10
Notes: Estimations for Equation 2 for all announcement days between December 16, 2008 and
March 30, 2015. i.e. 603 observations for each horizon. ∆rjt = α
j + ∑k βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet +
γs,jDstatet + δ
d,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet ) + ε
j
t; Newey-West standard errors in parentheses;
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. H0 : β = 0 tests for all βs being
jointly zero and states the respective p-value.
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Table 10 The Effect of Forward Guidance under Disagreement (iqr for eoy2) on Treasury
Yields
6months 1year 2years 3years 5years 10years 20years
Capacity 0.24 -0.08 0.52 0.56 0.09 -0.54 -0.74*
utilization (0.17) (0.23) (0.36) (0.39) (0.49) (0.46) (0.44)
Consumer 0.02 -0.12 0.41 0.40 0.57 0.60 0.74*
confidence (0.11) (0.32) (0.52) (0.48) (0.56) (0.44) (0.45)
Core CPI
-0.33 -0.19 -0.80 -0.72 -0.95 -1.00 -0.86
(0.24) (0.37) (0.68) (0.66) (0.83) (0.78) (0.63)
GDP advance
0.30* 0.10 0.99 1.68* 2.17* 2.54** 2.48**
(0.16) (0.15) (0.66) (1.00) (1.13) (1.19) (1.16)
ISM index
0.39** 0.06 0.35 0.76 1.17* 1.29* 1.24*
(0.17) (0.25) (0.63) (0.58) (0.67) (0.7) (0.67)
Leading -0.11 0.00 0.44 0.54 0.42 0.40 0.13
indicators (0.21) (0.15) (0.45) (0.63) (0.90) (0.95) (0.86)
New homes
0.20 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.14 -0.18 -0.11
(0.19) (0.21) (0.39) (0.44) (0.51) (0.42) (0.40)
Nonfarm 0.78* 2.54*** 5.93*** 5.45*** 5.69*** 4.07*** 3.76***
payrolls (0.43) (0.86) (2.01) (1.91) (1.67) (1.11) (0.96)
Core PPI
0.19 0.49 1.83** 2.43** 2.89*** 2.94*** 3.36***
(0.16) (0.40) (0.78) (0.97) (1.09) (1.02) (1.18)
Retail sales 0.18 0.36* 0.61 1.31** 1.90** 2.08*** 2.07***
ex. autos (0.13) (0.20) (0.46) (0.58) (0.82) (0.74) (0.74)
Unemployment
0.20 0.21 0.42 0.75 0.76 0.46 0.31
(0.22) (0.48) (1.04) (0.95) (0.94) (0.67) (0.62)
-0.80*** -0.86*** -0.96*** -0.89*** -0.84*** -0.71*** -0.73***
γd: Date (0.12) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.16) (0.16)
-2.68*** -1.37*** -1.51*** -1.31*** -0.45 0.13 0.47
γs: State
(0.74) (0.44) (0.51) (0.48) (0.50) (0.57) (0.66)
0.18 0.01 0.11* 0.28** 0.65*** 1.16*** 1.31***
δd: DA (Date) (0.22) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.21) (0.36) (0.38)
1.71** 0.88 1.43** 1.71** 0.93 0.40 -0.07
δs: DA (State)
(0.81) (0.67) (0.69) (0.76) (0.58) (0.61) (0.67)
H0 : β = 0 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
R2 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.10
Notes: Estimations for Equation 2 for all announcement days between December 16, 2008 and
March 30, 2015. i.e. 603 observations for each horizon. ∆rjt = α
j + ∑k βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet +
γs,jDstatet + δ
d,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet ) + ε
j
t; Newey-West standard errors in parentheses;
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. H0 : β = 0 tests for all βs being
jointly zero and states the respective p-value.
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Table 11 The Effect of Forward Guidance under Disagreement (range for eoy1) on Trea-
sury Yields
6months 1year 2years 3years 5years 10years 20years
Capacity 0.26 -0.22 0.33 0.44 -0.13 -0.67 -0.76*
utilization (0.18) (0.19) (0.38) (0.42) (0.5) (0.45) (0.42)
Consumer 0.06 -0.04 0.39 0.51 0.59 0.60 0.74
confidence (0.12) (0.33) (0.58) (0.53) (0.59) (0.46) (0.47)
Core CPI
-0.38 -0.19 -0.71 -0.71 -1.05 -1.09 -0.90
(0.26) (0.41) (0.76) (0.74) (0.92) (0.83) (0.64)
GDP advance
0.28* 0.09 1.13* 1.74* 2.12* 2.41* 2.44**
(0.17) (0.15) (0.66) (1.02) (1.15) (1.24) (1.18)
ISM index
0.36** -0.01 0.29 0.68 1.14* 1.28* 1.24*
(0.16) (0.24) (0.65) (0.60) (0.68) (0.71) (0.66)
Leading -0.12 0.01 0.48 0.58 0.45 0.38 0.08
indicators (0.21) (0.15) (0.47) (0.67) (0.95) (0.99) (0.86)
New homes
0.23 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.14 -0.16 -0.09
(0.18) (0.21) (0.41) (0.47) (0.54) (0.44) (0.41)
Nonfarm 0.75* 2.57*** 6.03*** 5.57*** 5.91*** 4.25*** 3.85***
payrolls (0.43) (0.86) (2.02) (1.92) (1.68) (1.13) (0.98)
Core PPI
0.13 0.48 1.74** 2.33** 2.64*** 2.61*** 3.04***
(0.15) (0.40) (0.73) (0.93) (0.99) (0.96) (1.14)
Retail sales 0.20 0.36* 0.55 1.29** 1.87** 2.06*** 2.06***
ex. autos (0.13) (0.20) (0.44) (0.58) (0.82) (0.74) (0.73)
Unemployment
0.14 0.16 0.31 0.63 0.61 0.34 0.22
(0.21) (0.47) (1.05) (0.95) (0.93) (0.66) (0.62)
-0.77*** -0.86*** -0.96*** -0.89*** -0.83*** -0.68*** -0.69***
γd: Date (0.14) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.15) (0.16)
-2.35*** -0.57* -0.45 -0.12 0.53 0.73 0.62
γs: State
(0.73) (0.31) (0.33) (0.47) (0.58) (0.60) (0.57)
0.18 0.00 0.10 0.28** 0.63*** 1.10*** 1.24***
δd: DA (Date) (0.22) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.2) (0.34) (0.38)
0.58* -0.05 0.07 0.11 -0.15 -0.19 -0.12
δs: DA (State)
(0.31) (0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25)
H0 : β = 0 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03
R2 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10
Notes: Estimations for Equation 2 for all announcement days between December 16, 2008 and
March 30, 2015. i.e. 603 observations for each horizon. ∆rjt = α
j + ∑k βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet +
γs,jDstatet + δ
d,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet ) + ε
j
t; Newey-West standard errors in parentheses;
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. H0 : β = 0 tests for all βs being
jointly zero and states the respective p-value.
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Table 12 The Effect of Forward Guidance under Disagreement (range for eoy2) on Trea-
sury Yields
6months 1year 2years 3years 5years 10years 20years
Capacity 0.20 -0.21 0.24 0.37 -0.21 -0.67 -0.73*
utilization (0.18) (0.19) (0.38) (0.41) (0.47) (0.43) (0.40)
Consumer 0.05 -0.03 0.36 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.72
confidence (0.13) (0.33) (0.59) (0.54) (0.58) (0.46) (0.48)
Core CPI
-0.31 -0.19 -0.72 -0.77 -1.13 -1.13 -0.91
(0.27) (0.40) (0.77) (0.77) (0.88) (0.8) (0.61)
GDP advance
0.33* 0.09 1.12* 1.70* 1.99* 2.32* 2.46**
(0.17) (0.15) (0.66) (1.03) (1.13) (1.24) (1.17)
ISM index
0.36** 0.00 0.31 0.68 1.17* 1.33* 1.28*
(0.18) (0.24) (0.64) (0.60) (0.68) (0.71) (0.65)
Leading -0.11 0.01 0.48 0.59 0.39 0.33 0.08
indicators (0.21) (0.15) (0.47) (0.68) (0.94) (0.98) (0.86)
New homes
0.22 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.09 -0.13 -0.10
(0.20) (0.21) (0.39) (0.47) (0.47) (0.41) (0.40)
Nonfarm 0.82* 2.57*** 6.06*** 5.64*** 6.01*** 4.28*** 3.84***
payrolls (0.45) (0.86) (2.02) (1.92) (1.69) (1.14) (0.98)
Core PPI
0.16 0.48 1.68** 2.24** 2.45*** 2.47*** 2.91**
(0.15) (0.40) (0.70) (0.88) (0.92) (0.94) (1.14)
Retail sales 0.21 0.36* 0.54 1.27** 1.87** 2.06*** 2.06***
ex. autos (0.14) (0.20) (0.43) (0.57) (0.82) (0.74) (0.73)
Unemployment
0.16 0.16 0.27 0.58 0.56 0.32 0.19
(0.22) (0.47) (1.02) (0.92) (0.88) (0.64) (0.61)
-0.79*** -0.86*** -0.96*** -0.89*** -0.82*** -0.66*** -0.68***
γd: Date (0.12) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.15) (0.17)
-2.72** -0.31 0.28 0.39 2.01 1.59 0.59
γs: State
(1.31) (0.72) (1.31) (1.60) (1.55) (1.45) (1.47)
0.10 0.00 0.06 0.16** 0.37*** 0.65*** 0.75***
δd: DA (Date) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.12) (0.20) (0.23)
0.43 -0.10 -0.18 -0.09 -0.52 -0.36 -0.06
δs: DA (State)
(0.36) (0.22) (0.4) (0.49) (0.42) (0.39) (0.43)
H0 : β = 0 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
R2 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10
Notes: Estimations for Equation 2 for all announcement days between December 16, 2008 and
March 30, 2015. i.e. 603 observations for each horizon. ∆rjt = α
j + ∑k βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet +
γs,jDstatet + δ
d,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet ) + ε
j
t; Newey-West standard errors in parentheses;
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. H0 : β = 0 tests for all βs being
jointly zero and states the respective p-value.
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Table 13 The Effect of Forward Guidance under Disagreement (sd for eoy1) on Treasury
Yields
6months 1year 2years 3years 5years 10years 20years
Capacity 0.22 -0.20 0.36 0.47 -0.07 -0.63 -0.74*
utilization (0.17) (0.20) (0.39) (0.42) (0.50) (0.47) (0.44)
Consumer 0.04 -0.04 0.39 0.50 0.59 0.60 0.75*
confidence (0.12) (0.33) (0.58) (0.53) (0.58) (0.44) (0.45)
Core CPI
-0.36 -0.19 -0.71 -0.68 -1.00 -1.04 -0.86
(0.27) (0.4) (0.75) (0.73) (0.90) (0.82) (0.64)
GDP advance
0.31* 0.09 1.13* 1.75* 2.15* 2.46** 2.49**
(0.17) (0.15) (0.66) (1.01) (1.13) (1.21) (1.16)
ISM index
0.37** -0.00 0.29 0.68 1.14* 1.28* 1.24*
(0.17) (0.25) (0.65) (0.60) (0.68) (0.71) (0.67)
Leading -0.12 0.01 0.47 0.57 0.45 0.40 0.13
indicators (0.21) (0.15) (0.47) (0.66) (0.93) (0.97) (0.85)
New homes
0.23 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.15 -0.17 -0.11
(0.19) (0.21) (0.41) (0.46) (0.53) (0.43) (0.40)
Nonfarm 0.77* 2.57*** 6.02*** 5.54*** 5.82*** 4.14*** 3.75***
payrolls (0.43) (0.86) (2.02) (1.92) (1.68) (1.11) (0.96)
Core PPI
0.15 0.48 1.74** 2.36** 2.76*** 2.88*** 3.39***
(0.16) (0.40) (0.74) (0.95) (1.04) (1.00) (1.19)
Retail sales 0.20 0.36* 0.56 1.29** 1.89** 2.07*** 2.07***
ex. autos (0.13) (0.20) (0.44) (0.58) (0.83) (0.75) (0.74)
Unemployment
0.14 0.16 0.34 0.67 0.68 0.42 0.31
(0.22) (0.48) (1.05) (0.96) (0.95) (0.67) (0.62)
-0.79*** -0.86*** -0.96*** -0.89*** -0.84*** -0.71*** -0.73***
γd: Date (0.13) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16)
-2.26*** -0.65** -0.53* -0.23 0.40 0.57 0.45
γs: State
(0.68) (0.27) (0.29) (0.43) (0.54) (0.57) (0.55)
0.71 0.03 0.35* 0.90** 2.08*** 3.73*** 4.24***
δd: DA (Date) (0.75) (0.21) (0.2) (0.36) (0.66) (1.13) (1.24)
1.93* -0.01 0.42 0.67 -0.22 -0.30 -0.06
δs: DA (State)
(1.06) (0.64) (0.70) (0.93) (0.86) (0.87) (0.94)
H0 : β = 0 0.14 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
R2 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10
Notes: Estimations for Equation 2 for all announcement days between December 16, 2008 and
March 30, 2015. i.e. 603 observations for each horizon. ∆rjt = α
j + ∑k βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet +
γs,jDstatet + δ
d,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet ) + ε
j
t; Newey-West standard errors in parentheses;
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. H0 : β = 0 tests for all βs being
jointly zero and states the respective p-value.
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Table 14 The Effect of Forward Guidance under Disagreement (sd for eoy2) on Treasury
Yields
6months 1year 2years 3years 5years 10years 20years
Capacity 0.20 -0.21 0.23 0.34 -0.18 -0.64 -0.73*
utilization (0.19) (0.19) (0.38) (0.4) (0.47) (0.44) (0.42)
Consumer 0.04 -0.02 0.34 0.51 0.52 0.57 0.73
confidence (0.13) (0.33) (0.58) (0.54) (0.57) (0.45) (0.47)
Core CPI -0.29 -0.18 -0.71 -0.77 -1.09 -1.09 -0.87(0.26) (0.40) (0.76) (0.76) (0.86) (0.79) (0.62)
GDP advance 0.35** 0.08 1.13* 1.66 2.00* 2.38* 2.51**(0.17) (0.15) (0.65) (1.02) (1.12) (1.23) (1.16)
ISM index 0.35** -0.01 0.31 0.67 1.14* 1.30* 1.25*(0.18) (0.24) (0.64) (0.59) (0.67) (0.71) (0.65)
Leading -0.12 0.00 0.46 0.57 0.38 0.36 0.12
indicators (0.21) (0.15) (0.47) (0.68) (0.93) (0.98) (0.86)
New homes 0.21 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.10 -0.15 -0.11(0.20) (0.20) (0.38) (0.44) (0.46) (0.41) (0.41)
Nonfarm 0.83* 2.57*** 6.06*** 5.67*** 5.98*** 4.23*** 3.80***
payrolls (0.45) (0.86) (2.02) (1.92) (1.69) (1.14) (0.97)
Core PPI 0.17 0.47 1.66** 2.19** 2.50*** 2.64*** 3.12***(0.16) (0.39) (0.69) (0.85) (0.94) (0.97) (1.17)
Retail sales 0.22 0.36* 0.55 1.27** 1.87** 2.07*** 2.07***
ex. autos (0.14) (0.20) (0.43) (0.57) (0.81) (0.74) (0.73)
Unemployment 0.16 0.16 0.30 0.59 0.62 0.37 0.24(0.23) (0.47) (1.00) (0.90) (0.88) (0.65) (0.61)
-0.8*** -0.86*** -0.96*** -0.89*** -0.83*** -0.68*** -0.71***
γd: Date (0.12) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.15) (0.16)
-2.64** 0.12 0.81 1.18 2.48 1.38 0.20
γs: State (1.29) (0.81) (1.44) (1.70) (1.67) (1.50) (1.56)
0.32 0.01 0.18 0.46** 1.05*** 1.86*** 2.13***
δd: DA (Date) (0.37) (0.12) (0.11) (0.18) (0.34) (0.58) (0.64)
1.43 -0.79 -1.17 -1.15 -2.30 -1.02 0.22
δs: DA (State) (1.26) (0.8) (1.47) (1.72) (1.57) (1.44) (1.62)
H0 : β = 0 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02
R2 0.05 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.10
Notes: Estimations for Equation 2 for all announcement days between December 16, 2008 and
March 30, 2015. i.e. 603 observations for each horizon. ∆rjt = α
j + ∑k βk,jskt (1 + γ
d,jDdatet +
γs,jDstatet + δ
d,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet ) + ε
j
t; Newey-West standard errors in parentheses;
*** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. H0 : β = 0 tests for all βs being
jointly zero and states the respective p-value.
[15] Ehrmann, M. and Fratzscher, M. (2013). Dispersed Communication by Central
Bank Committees and the Predictability of Monetary Decisions. Public Choice, 157(1-
2):223–244.
[16] European Central Bank (2014). The ECB’s Forward Guidance. ECB Monthly Bul-
letin April, pages 358–361.
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Table 15 The Role of Policy Uncertainty
6months 1year 2years 3years 5years 10years 20years
Capacity 0.28** -0.14 0.55 0.65* 0.23 -0.54 -0.68
utilization (0.13) (0.22) (0.36) (0.39) (0.47) (0.46) (0.42)
Consumer -0.03 -0.05 0.38 0.39 0.57 0.59 0.73*
confidence (0.05) (0.31) (0.50) (0.47) (0.53) (0.38) (0.39)
Core CPI -0.47** -0.17 -0.74 -0.63 -0.78 -0.78 -0.60(0.24) (0.37) (0.63) (0.60) (0.76) (0.77) (0.64)
GDP advance 0.20 0.11 1.09* 1.75* 2.16** 2.31** 2.24**(0.18) (0.15) (0.62) (0.97) (1.08) (1.14) (1.12)
ISM index 0.32** 0.06 0.28 0.67 1.14* 1.28* 1.26*(0.14) (0.25) (0.63) (0.59) (0.67) (0.69) (0.65)
Leading -0.14 0.00 0.38 0.51 0.40 0.41 0.15
indicators (0.19) (0.15) (0.44) (0.61) (0.87) (0.94) (0.87)
New homes 0.20 0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.18 -0.17 -0.11(0.15) (0.20) (0.37) (0.41) (0.47) (0.39) (0.37)
Nonfarm 0.65 2.54*** 5.88*** 5.35*** 5.47*** 3.91*** 3.61***
payrolls (0.41) (0.86) (2.02) (1.91) (1.67) (1.10) (0.94)
Core PPI 0.22 0.49 1.78** 2.47** 3.02** 3.23*** 3.89***(0.14) (0.40) (0.79) (1.02) (1.18) (1.09) (1.26)
Retail sales 0.19 0.36* 0.63 1.32** 1.89** 2.10** 2.10***
ex. Autos (0.13) (0.20) (0.46) (0.57) (0.80) (0.75) (0.75)
Unemployment 0.19 0.23 0.55 0.89 1.02 0.74 0.62(0.18) (0.47) (1.05) (0.97) (0.99) (0.68) (0.60)
-0.74*** -0.86*** -0.96*** -0.88*** -0.82*** -0.71*** -0.75***
γd: Date (0.16) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.17) (0.16)
-2.03*** -0.72*** -0.69*** -0.34 0.19 0.72 0.78
γs: State (0.49) (0.17) (0.25) (0.37) (0.51) (0.58) (0.54)
1.32 0.04 0.41** 0.95** 2.14*** 3.91*** 4.39***
δd: DA (Date) (1.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.40) (0.81) (1.26) (1.30)
0.28 0.54 0.98** 1.11* 0.63 0.24 0.02
δs: DA (State) (0.52) (0.48) (0.45) (0.58) (0.52) (0.52) (0.52)
η policy -1.01* 0.11 -0.09 -0.19 -0.01 0.39 0.46
uncertainty (0.59) (0.14) (0.16) (0.25) (0.33) (0.40) (0.39)
H0 : β = 0 0.20 0.17 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02
R2 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.10
Notes: Estimations for Equation 3 for all announcement days between December 16, 2008 and
March 30, 2015. i.e. 603 observations for each horizon. Disagreement is measured by the in-
terquartile range of dot projections iqr for the end of next year eoy1. ∆r
j
t = α
j + ∑k βk,jskt (1 +
γd,jDdatet + γ
s,jDstatet + δ
d,jDAt · Ddatet + δs,jDAt · Dstatet + η j pt · Ddotst ) + ε
j
t; Newey-West stan-
dard errors in parentheses; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at the 1% (5%) [10%] level. H0 : β = 0
tests for all βs being jointly zero and states the respective p-value.
[17] Federal Reserve System (2003). Statement / Press Release on August 12, 2003.
[18] Federal Reserve System (2011). Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee,
December 13, 2011.
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January 24-25, 2012.
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[22] Ferrero, G. and Secchi, A. (2009). The Announcement of Monetary Policy Inten-
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Models. American Economic Review, 95(1):425–436.
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MIT Press.
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